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FRAUD—RELIANCE—FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY MAY NOT
SATISFY RELIANCE REQUIREMENT IN CLAIMS OF COMMON LAW FRAUD
OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION—Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 165 N.J.
94, 754 A.2d 1188 (2000).
The defendant, i-Stat Corporation (i-Stat), allegedly overstated the
sales and demand of its products in public announcements. Kaufman v. IStat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 98-99, 754 A.2d 1188, 1190 (2000). -i Stat, a
publicly traded corporation, experienced a decline in its stock value and
heavy trading after its sales procedures were discovered and publicized.
The plaintiff, Susan Kaufman, who brought suit on behalf of a
putative class, was a shareholder of i-Stat during the alleged period of
misrepresentation. Id. at 99, 754 A.2d at 1190. When purchasing her
stock, Ms. Kaufman relied solely on the market price of i-Stat, and not on iStat’s misrepresentations. Id. at 100, 754 A.2d at 1191. Ms. Kaufman
brought suit against i-Stat, and other named defendants, alleging, among
other things, common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Id., 754
A.2d at 1190. Ms. Kaufman claimed i-Stat’s misrepresentations of its sales
inflated its stock price during the named period. Because Ms. Kaufman did
not rely on any alleged misrepresentations of i-Stat when purchasing her
stock, the plaintiff depended upon the fraud-on-the-market theory to satisfy
the reliance element of common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
Id., 754 A.2d at 1191. The fraud-on-the-market theory creates a rebuttable
presumption of reliance based upon an efficient market’s incorporation of
misrepresentations and omissions into a stock’s price. Id. at 97, 101, 754
A.2d at 1189, 1191 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
The Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary judgment in
favor of i-Stat, holding that the fraud-on-the-market theory may not satisfy
reliance in claims of common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation
under New Jersey law. Id. at 100, 754 A.2d at 1191. The appellate
division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint regarding
negligent misrepresentation, but reversed the dismissal of the common law
fraud claim. Id. The appellate division reasoned that the fraud-on-themarket theory could satisfy the reliance element of a common law fraud
claim, but not a claim of negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 101, 754 A.2d
at 1191.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine
whether the fraud-on-the-market theory may satisfy the reliance element of
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common law fraud. Id. at 103, 754 A.2d at 1192. Justice LaVecchia,
writing for a majority of four justices, held that the fraud-on-the-market
theory does not satisfy the reliance element of common law fraud or
negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 118, 754 A.2d at 1201.
The majority began the analysis with a discussion of the relevant
federal security laws, noting that Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 prohibits defendant’s alleged acts and entitles plaintiff to
damages. Id. at 103, 754 A.2d at 1192-93. The court observed, however,
that the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA) has restricted a plaintiff’s ability to recover. Id. at 104, 754 A.2d
at 1193. Justice LaVecchia noted that the PSLRA imposes several
restrictions upon a plaintiff alleging claims under the federal securities
laws. Id. at 104, 754 A.2d at 1193. The majority explained that plaintiffs
have been filing weaker securities claims in state courts to avoid the
strictures of the PSLRA. Id. at 105, 754 A.2d at 1193. The court observed
that upon the filing of these substitute Rule 10b-5 actions under state law,
plaintiffs attempt to have the presiding court incorporate the fraud-on-themarket theory into that state’s common law. Id.
Justice LaVecchia asserted that Congress enacted the SLUSA in
response to the circumvention of the PSLRA through substitute state law
claims. Id. at 106, 754 A.2d at 1194. The court clarified that the SLUSA
restricts the ability of plaintiffs to bring federal securities actions in state
courts. Id. at 107, 754 A.2d at 1194. The majority cautioned, however,
that excepted plaintiffs under the SLUSA can still bring substitute Rule
10b-5 actions in state court. Id. Justice LaVecchia forewarned that if New
Jersey incorporated the fraud-on-the-market theory into its common law,
these excepted plaintiffs could forum shop, bringing substitute Rule 10b-5
actions under New Jersey common law. Id.
The court next analyzed the current reliance requirement under
common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 108-11, 754
A.2d at 1195-97. Justice LaVecchia noted that the reliance requirement is
the same under claims of common law fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. Id. at 109, 754 A.2d at 1195. The court articulated that
proof of indirect reliance will satisfy the reliance element of both claims.
Id. The majority asserted that indirect reliance allows a plaintiff to satisfy
the reliance requirement when the plaintiff heard and relied upon
misstatements from a defendant’s agent or a third party. Id. at 108, 754
A.2d at 1195. The court stressed that, when proving indirect reliance, the
plaintiff must actually receive and consider the misstatements or omissions.
Id. at 109, 754 A.2d at 1195. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the
fraud-on-the-market theory, which allows a plaintiff to prove reliance
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without showing actual receipt and consideration of the misrepresentations
or omissions, contravenes and weakens the current indirect reliance
requirement. Id. at 118, 754 A.2d at 1200-01. Because the plaintiff here
admittedly did not rely on the alleged misstatements of -i Stat, the court
held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently show a claim for fraud. Id. at
111, 754 A.2d at 1197.
Justice LaVecchia also found persuasive the analysis of indirect
reliance and the fraud-on-the-market theory’s applicability to state claims
undertaken by courts in other jurisdictions. Id. at 106, 110-11, 754 A.2d at
1194, 1196. The majority identified three other courts that require actual
reliance on the misrepresentations under a theory of indirect reliance: the
Florida District Court of Appeals, the California Court of Appeals, and the
California Supreme Court. Id. at 110-11, 754 A.2d at 1196 (citations and
quotation omitted). Justice LaVecchia also asserted that no state court has
accepted a fraud-on-the-market theory, outside of dictum, under state law.
Id. at 113, 754 A.2d at 1198. The majority further noted that the United
States District Court of New Jersey, and other federal courts with
jurisdiction in New Jersey, have declined to accept the fraud-on-the-market
theory under state law. Id. at 106, 754 A.2d at 1194.
In addition to the persuasive analysis of other courts, the majority
considered the Uniform Securities Law (USL), New Jersey’s statutory
securities law, in rejecting the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 112-13,
754 A.2d at 1197-98. The court explained that the USL does not require
securities-fraud plaintiffs to prove reliance on any misrepresentation or
omission. Id. at 112, 754 A.2d at 1197. Justice LaVecchia emphasized,
however, that the USL requires privity in securities-fraud actions. Id. The
court observed that the privity requirement was not met in this case. Id. As
a result, Justice LaVecchia propounded that permitting the fraud-on-themarket theory to establish reliance in this case would allow the plaintiff to
avoid the New Jersey Legislature’s securities-fraud requirements and
policy decisions as articulated by the USL. Id. at 112-13, 754 A.2d at
1197-98.
Finally, Justice LaVecchia questioned the economic validity of the
fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 113-18, 754 A.2d at 1198-1201. The
court examined at length the academic, professional, and judicial criticism
of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, the economic theory
underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. The majority noted its
reluctance to extend a theory used in the carefully balanced system of
federal securities laws—the economic validity of which is strongly
questioned—into the broad world of common law fraud. Id. at 116-17, 754
A.2d at 1200. Justice LaVecchia observed that adopting the fraud-on-themarket theory for claims of common law fraud would allow future
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plaintiffs to satisfy reliance by claiming efficient markets exist in areas
outside of securities. Id. The majority warned that the movement of such a
specialized doctrine into the common law context, which has a more
general application, would be dangerous. Id. at 118, 754 A.2d at 1200.
Justice LaVecchia also noted that the acceptance of the fraud-on-themarket theory in a common law securities claim is especially unwarranted
because an adequate federal remedy was available to the plaintiff. Id.
Justice Stein, in an opinion joined by Justice O’Hern and Justice
Long, dissented from the majority’s opinion. Id. at 119, 754 A.2d at 1201
(Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein, agreeing with the appellate division’s
analysis, argued that the fraud-on-the-market theory should be capable of
satisfying the reliance element of a common law fraud claim. Id.
The dissent analyzed the concept of indirect reliance and the United
States Supreme Court’s treatment and definition of the fraud-on-the-market
theory within a federal securities-fraud context, and challenged the
majority’s determination regarding plaintiff’s failure to prove indirect
reliance. Id. at 120-25, 754 A.2d at 1201-04 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice
Stein asserted that the principles of indirect reliance apply to publicly
traded securities where a fraud is made on the public as a whole. Id. at 120,
754 A.2d at 1201-02 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the dissent propounded that indirect reliance only
requires a misrepresentation, with the intention that it will be
communicated to third parties for the purpose of inducing reliance upon
said misrepresentation. Id., 754 A.2d at 1201 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Justice Stein opined that the stock market itself conveys information to the
plaintiff. Id. Consequently, the dissent concluded that i-Stat conveyed its
misrepresentations to the plaintiff through i-Stat’s stock price. Id. Justice
Stein further asserted that the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of
the fraud-on-the-market theory in federal securities law claims applies
equally to claims of common law fraud. Id. at 123, 754 A.2d at 1203
(Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the reliance element of
common law fraud is almost identical to that of a federal securities law
claim. Id.
Justice Stein also chastised the majority’s discussion of the economic
theory underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. at 124, 754 A.2d at
1204 (Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent opined that the court need not
accept the efficient market hypothesis underlying the fraud-on-the-market
theory. Id. The dissent argued instead that the court must only accept the
right of investors to assume that misrepresentations or omissions have not
affected stock prices. Id.
Moreover, the dissent commented that the existence and strictures of
federal securities claims should not favor rejecting an application of the
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fraud-on-the-market theory under common law fraud. Id. at 125, 754 A.2d
at 1204 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein justified this position by stating
that Congress intended the federal securities laws to supplement, not
preempt, state law. Id. Lastly, Justice Stein criticized the majority’s fear of
future common law securities-fraud claims, observing that the PSLRA and
the SLUSA restrict the access to state courts by most securities claim
plaintiffs. Id. at 126-27, 754 A.2d at 1205 (Stein, J., dissenting). The
dissent insisted that those plaintiffs exempted from federal restrictions
should receive the full benefit of the fraud-on-the-market theory in their
state securities claims. Id.
Civil securities-fraud claims are often vexatious, driven by attorney’s
fees and coercive settlement negotiations. This reality of securities-fraud
litigation is balanced against a desire to provide legitimate relief for
plaintiffs through both federal and state securities laws. Whatever place
the fraud-on-the-market theory has in the balance of statutory securitiesfraud, no place exists for it in common law actions. The majority, in a
well-reasoned opinion, prevents plaintiffs from circumventing the
procedural barriers of well balanced federal and state securities laws
through substitute common law actions.
Shrewd plaintiffs undoubtedly would seek to take advantage of the
fraud-on-the-market theory’s relaxed reliance requirements in the broader
range of issues that common law fraud reaches. For example, plaintiffs
have already sought to apply the fraud-on-the-market theory to consumer
fraud and malpractice claims. Id. at 117, 754 A.2d at 1200 (citations
omitted). As the majority noted, one plaintiff has gone so far as to claim
that basketball season ticket holders were defrauded, under the fraud-onthe-market theory, when an athlete was traded to another team. Id. (citation
omitted). Extending the reliance element of common law fraud would
open up a Pandora’s box of debate over what constitutes a market. Such an
endless dispute would waste New Jersey courts’ time and resources, with
no corresponding benefit.
Scott H. Moss

